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Abstract
This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both
injurers and victims can take care. The basic conclusions of that literature remain
valid in this context: the private and social values generally differ, and there is no
necessary relationship between them, meaning that there may be either too many
or too few suits. Introducing the possibility of victim care does, however, alter the
calculation of the deterrent effect of lawsuits. In particular, because allowing suits
tends to reduce the incentives for victims to invest in precaution, the social value
of prohibiting suits increases in direct relation to the productivity of victim care
in lowering accident risk.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: K13, K40, K41
Keywords: Accidents, deterrence, lawsuits, litigation costs, social versus pri-
vate value
 1
A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits  





 In the economic theory of tort law, the social value of lawsuits lies in their ability 
to give potential injurers an incentive to invest in cost-effective accident avoidance.1  
Unlike regulations, however, lawsuits can only perform this function if victims are 
willing to incur the cost of filing suit.  In this respect, models in which litigation is 
assumed to be costless miss an important aspect of the legal process. 
 Shavell (1982) was the first to examine the relationship between the social and 
private values of lawsuits in a costly legal system. He concluded that there is no 
necessary connection between the two.  That is, in some cases lawsuits will be privately 
valuable but not socially valuable, while in other cases the reverse will be true.  As a 
result, there may be either too much or too little litigation from a social perspective.  
Subsequent literature has extended the analysis to consider different liability rules, the 
impact of settlement, and different remedies to correct the misalignment between the 
private and social value of suits.2 All of these models, however, focus on accidents in 
which only the injurer can take care, thus ignoring the effect that suits might have on 
incentives for victim care.  In particular, because victims will only file suit if they expect 
to receive compensation for their damages, the promise of compensation will dilute their 
incentives to undertake precaution based on the usual moral hazard problem.3  The 
overall deterrent effect of suits is thereby reduced.  The purpose of this note is to extend 
                         
1
 See Brown (1973), Landes and Posner (1987), and Shavell (1987). 
2
 See, for example, Menell (1983), Kaplow (1986), Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld (1987), Polinsky and 
Che (1991), and Shavell (1997, 1999).  
3
 It does not, however, entirely eliminate their incentive to take care to the extent that they have 
uncompensated losses.  
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the existing literature on the social versus private value of suits to examine this effect in 
detail.   
The paper first develops the basic model assuming that liability is strict.  It then 
extends the analysis to negligence, and concludes by considering the effect of a change to 
the British rule for allocating legal costs.        
 
2. The Basic Model 
 Consider a bilateral care accident model in which an injurer (defendant) and 
victim (plaintiff) can both invest in care to reduce the probability of an accident.  
Specifically, let x be the defendant’s expenditure on care, let y be the plaintiff’s 
expenditure on care, and let p(x,y) be the probability of an accident, where px<0, py<0, 
pxx>0, pyy>0.  In the event of an accident, the plaintiff incurs a financial loss of L, which 
is a random variable drawn from the distribution function F(L).  At the time of the 
accident, the plaintiff observes her loss, but the injurer does not, though he knows the 
distribution.  Finally, let the cost of trial be cd for the defendant and cp for the plaintiff. 
 We begin by defining two notions of efficiency in this context.  First, when 
litigation costs are zero, the efficient levels of injurer and victim care are those that 
minimize expected accident costs: 
  x + y + p(x,y)E(L),       (1) 
where E(L) is the victim’s expected loss.  The relevant first order conditions are 
  1 + pxE(L) = 0        (2.1) 
  1 + pyE(L) = 0.        (2.2) 
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Condition (2.1) defines the function x*(y) while condition (2.2) defines the function 
y*(x).  These represent the efficient care levels for each party, given the care choice of the 
other.  Jointly, they determine the zero-litigation-cost, or first-best, optimum (x*,y*).   
 The second notion of efficiency takes account of litigation costs.  It therefore 
depends on the filing decision of victims.  To this end, we need to examine the private 
value of lawsuits to plaintiffs, assuming for now that the liability rule is strict liability.  
The private value of lawsuits is based solely on the value of a suit to the plaintiff 
compared to the cost of a suit.  Thus, once an accident occurs, plaintiffs with L≥cp will 
file suit, while those with L<cp will not.  The probability of a lawsuit, conditional on an 
accident having occurred, is therefore 1–F(cp).   
 Given the foregoing, overall social costs conditional on an accident are  
  S = E(L) + (1–F(cp))(cp+cd).      (2) 
Efficient injurer and victim care in the presence of litigation costs therefore minimize 
  x + y + p(x,y)S.       (3) 
The resulting first order conditions are 
  1 + pxS  = 0        (4.1) 
  1 + pyS = 0.        (4.2) 
As above, these define the functions )(~ yx  and )(~ xy , respectively, and jointly, they 
determine the second-best optimal care levels ( yx ~,~ ).  Note that because S>E(L), x~ >x* 
and y~ >y*.  Thus, the efficient care levels are higher due to the cost of litigation. 
2.1. The Social Value of Lawsuits  
 The social value of lawsuits in the current model is based on their ability to 
induce injurers and victims to take care to avoid accidents.  As noted, while lawsuits 
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encourage injurers to take care, they may have the offsetting effect of discouraging victim 
care.   
 With this in mind, consider first the care choice of the injurer.  Given the filing 
decision of plaintiffs as described above, the injurer computes his expected costs (liability 
plus trial costs) conditional on an accident to be 
  A = [1–F(cp)]E[L+cd | L≥cp] 




d LdFcL )()( .       (5) 
The injurer therefore chooses care to minimize 
  x + p(x,y)A,        (6) 
taking the victim’s care level as given.  The resulting first order condition is 
  1 + pxA = 0,        (7) 
which defines the injurer’s reaction function, )(ˆ yx . 
 Now consider the victim’s choice of care.  In contrast to the bilateral care model 
without litigation costs, victims will invest in some care under strict liability because they 
have some uncompensated losses.  In particular, victims who do not file will bear their 
full damages, while those who do file will bear their own trial costs.  Thus, at the time a 
potential victim makes her care choice (i.e., before she knows her actual loss), her 
expected costs conditional on an accident are   
  B = [1–F(cp)]cp + F(cp)E(L | L<cp] 




)( .      (8) 
The victim thus chooses care to minimize 
  y + p(x,y)B,        (9) 
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taking the injurer’s care as given.  The resulting first order condition is 
  1 + pyB = 0,        (10) 
which defines the victim’s reaction function, )(ˆ xy .   The intersection of the reaction 
functions for the injurer and victim determines the Nash equilibrium, ( yx ˆ,ˆ ). 
To evaluate this equilibrium, observe from (2), (5), and (8) that S=A+B.  Thus, 
litigation costs result in a strict division of social costs between the injurer and victim 
under strict liability.  It follows that xx ~ˆ <  and yy ~ˆ < ; that is, both parties are 
underdeterred relative to the second-best  optimum.  Social costs in this case are given by  
  SCS = Syxpyx )ˆ,ˆ(ˆˆ ++ .      (11) 
 Consider now the care choices of injurers and victims when lawsuits are 
prohibited (or, equivalently, when the rule is no liability).  Note first that injurers will 
take no care because they face no threat of liability.  Thus, as is the case in the unilateral 
care model, x=0.   In contrast, victims will take care because their losses are 
uncompensated.  Specifically, a potential victim will choose y to minimize 
  y + p(0,y)E(L).       (12) 
Note that the solution to this problem, )0(*y , is the victim’s first-best care, given x=0.  
The resulting expression for social costs is 
  SCN = )())0(*,0()0(* LEypy + ,     (13) 
which is actually the minimized value of social costs, subject to x=0. 
 The social desirability of suits can now be determined by comparing (11) and 
(13).  Suits are desirable if SCS<SCN, or, after rearranging, if 
 )ˆ,ˆ( yxp  [1–F(cp)](cp+cd) < [y* (0) + p(0, *y (0))E(L)] 
      – [ )]()ˆ,ˆ(ˆˆ LEyxpyx ++ .  (14) 
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The left-hand side of this condition represents the expected litigation costs of allowing 
lawsuits, while the right-hand side is the deterrence benefits of lawsuits.  Note that while 
the left-hand side is clearly positive, the right-hand side may be positive or negative, 
depending on the relative productivity of care by injurers and victims.  In other words, 
prohibiting suits may actually lower social costs because of the incentives this creates for 
victims to invest in care.  This is the chief difference between the current model and the 
unilateral care case.   
2.2. A Numerical Example 
 A numerical example illustrates the above analysis.  Let the probability of an 
accident have the separable form 
  p(x,y) = αe-x + βe-y,       (15) 
where α +
β
=γ .  This function has the property that injurer and victim care are 
independent, which greatly simplifies the calculations without sacrificing the basic 
elements of the model.  Also let L be uniformly distributed on [0, $1,000], implying that 
E(L)=$500, let cp=cd=$100, and letγ =.1.  For the first example, we take α=β=.05.  
Then, from (5), A=$585, and from (8), B=$95.  It follows that, under strict liability, 
xˆ =3.376 and yˆ =1.558, while under no liability, x=0 and y*=3.219.  Using these results, 
we find that the left-hand side of (14) is 2.196, while the right-hand side is 18.185.  Thus, 
the deterrent benefits of lawsuits greatly outweigh the expected litigation costs, making 
suits socially valuable. 
 As a counterexample, let α=.01 and β =.09.  Thus, the importance of injurer care 
is substantially reduced relative to victim care.  All other variables remain the same.  In 
this example, xˆ =1.766, yˆ =2.146, and y*=3.807.  While the left-hand side of (14) 
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remains about the same, at 2.196, the right-hand side is now −.205, implying that 
switching to a rule of no liability actually increases deterrence.  Obviously, therefore, 
suits are not socially valuable in this case.  Finally, note that the private value of a suit is 
the same in both examples.  Specifically, victims with L>$100 (or 90% of victims) file 
suit in the event of an accident.    
 
3. Negligence 
 Under a negligence rule, a victim will file suit if his or her accident loss exceeds 
the filing cost, and if the injurer failed to meet the due standard of care, denoted z.  
Injurers therefore avoid liability and litigation costs by meeting the due standard, but if 
they fail to meet the standard, they are strictly liable.  Thus, the injurer’s problem is to 
choose x to minimize   
  x,  x≥z 
           (16) 
  x+p(x,y)A, x<z, 
 
where A is defined by (5).  The injurer therefore either meets the due care standard (i.e., 
sets x=z), or chooses )(ˆ yx , the level of care that minimizes the second line of (16), 
depending on which yields lower costs.  Obviously, the due standard, z, is crucial for this 
choice. 
 Note first that in the model without litigation costs, if the due standard is set at x*, 
the injurer’s first-best level of care, then the efficient outcome is the unique Nash 
equilibrium (Shavell, 1987, p. 40).  That is, the injurer chooses x*  to avoid liability, and 
the victim chooses  y*  to minimize her expected costs.  We now show that this outcome 
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may also be an equilibrium when litigation is costly, but it is not necessarily a unique 
equilibrium. 
 To begin, let z=x*, and suppose that y=y*(x*)=y*.  The injurer’s best-response is 
to choose x* if 
  x* ≤ Ayyxpyx *)*),(ˆ(*)(ˆ + .      (15) 
In this case, the injurer avoids liability, leaving the victim to bear her own costs.  She will 
therefore choose y*(x*)=y* and will not file suit.  This establishes that (x*,y*) is a Nash 
equilibrium when (15) holds.   
 To see that this equilibrium need not be unique, suppose y= )ˆ(ˆ xy and that 
  x* > Axyxpx ))ˆ(ˆ,ˆ(ˆ + .       (16) 
When this condition holds, the injurer’s optimal strategy is to violate the due standard 
and choose care of )ˆ(ˆˆ yxx = , as he would under strict liability, while the victim’s best 
response is to choose )ˆ(ˆˆ xyy =  and file suit if and only if L ≥ cp.  In this case, ( yx ˆ,ˆ ) is also 
a Nash equilibrium.  The reason such an equilibrium may exist here is that A does not 
generally equal E(L);  A may be smaller than E(L) because A does not include the losses 
of those victims who do not file suit, and A may be larger than E(L) because it includes 
the injurer’s litigation costs.  Thus, if E(L) if is larger than A, in which case x* is larger 
than xˆ , it is possible that (16) will hold.  When it does, the outcome is identical to that 
under strict liability. 
 
4. The British Rule for Allocating Legal Costs 
 When the British rule for allocating legal costs is relevant, the injurer will bear the 
victim’s trial costs under strict liability because the victim will win with certainty, 
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provided that she sustained damages.  Thus, all victims with L>0 will file suit.  The 
injurer therefore chooses x to minimize 
  x + p(x,y)[E(L) + cp + cd].      (17) 
Note that the resulting level of injurer care, denoted xB(y), coincides with socially optimal 
care in this case, given y and the fact that all victims file suit.  (Thus, xB(y) is larger than 
)(~ yx  for any y because of the greater number of suits here.)  Victims, in contrast, bear no 
residual costs so they choose zero care.  The resulting equilibrium is (xB(0), 0).  Note that 
this outcome differs from that under the American rule above, where the losses were 
divided between the injurer and victim, thus inducing both parties to take some care 
(though each took less than the efficient level). 
 When suits are prohibited, the equilibrium is the same as under the American rule; 
that is, injurers choose no care and victims choose first-best care, y*(0), given x=0.  Suits 
are valuable in this case if 
  p(xB(0),0)(cp+cd) < [y* (0) + p(0, *y (0))E(L)]  
      – [xB(0) + p(xB(0),0)E(L)],  (18) 
which has the same interpretation as (14).  The difference here is that only one party 
takes care under the different regimes, and that level is efficient, given the behavior of the 
other party.  In this sense, the right-hand side of (18) is a least-cost-avoider comparison. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper has re-examined the social versus private value of lawsuits when both 
injurers and victims can take care.  The basic conclusions of that literature remain valid in 
this context—namely, that the private and social values will generally differ, and that 
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there is no necessary relationship between them, meaning that there may be either too 
many or too few suits.  Introducing the possibility of victim care does, however, alter the 
calculation of the deterrent effect of lawsuits.  In particular, because allowing suits tends 
to reduce the incentives for victims to invest in precaution due to the usual moral hazard 
problem, the social value of prohibiting suits increases in direct relation to the 
productivity of victim care in lowering accident risk. 
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